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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A reevaluation of ESO’s missions related to the implementation of Chapter VII of
the Euratom Treaty has been conducted in the second half of the year 2001. It led to
recommendations made to the Commission on ESO’s objectives, working methods,
internal structure and management policy.
A changing environment for the nuclear industries activities, but also in the legal
framework in which safeguards are applied, led ESO to take the initiative of
preparing a draft for a new regulation, replacing the existing Regulation (Euratom)
n° 3227/76, in force for more than 25 years.
Reporting by the nuclear installation operators on nuclear materials flows and
inventories was fulfilled in compliance with Euratom treaty requirements. All data
was checked and clerical errors or inconsistencies corrected.
Verification activities conducted by ESO inspection staff led to the conclusion that,
apart from some discrepancies between evaluations carried out by operators and ESO
inspectors, which are in the process of being solved, no diversion of nuclear material
from its intended use was established.
Effective cooperation between ESO and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) on the territory of the EU resulted in confirmation – reflected in the
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 2000 issued by the IAEA - that no evidence
of nuclear material diversion or misuse of equipment or facilities placed under
safeguards in the EU was found.
In addition to its global conclusions, the SIR 2000 identified some areas for
improvement concerning different technical aspects and verification procedures. The
need of enhanced cooperation with the IAEA for the implementation of the
Additional Protocols to the existing safeguards agreements was clearly stated.
Founded on the legal basis of the Euratom Treaty, ESO activities are financed by two
different budget appropriations, one concerning general functioning of ESO as any
other service of the Commission and the second one related to specific operational
costs in the field of nuclear safeguards. Details on the way in which the budget was
spent in 2001 are provided in this report.
As an overall conclusion of the Annual Report 2001, it may be stated that the
objectives defined for ESO’s activities as set out in Chapter VII of the Euratom
Treaty were satisfactorily met.
32. MISSION AND LEGAL BASIS OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS
The task of the Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO) is to ensure that within the
European Union nuclear material is not diverted from its intended use and that
safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement with a
third state or an international organisation are complied with. Chapter VII of the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly called the
Euratom Treaty, and the implementing Euratom Regulation No. 3227/76 as amended
constitute the legal basis of Euratom Safeguards1.
3. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: MISSION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE EURATOM
SAFEGUARDS OFFICE
3.1. Implementation of the Results of the Internal Commission Audit
Following the July 1999 announcement of President Prodi concerning the
organisation of the new Commission, a general inspection of the structures of the
Euratom Safeguards Office was carried out. The Inspectorate General of the Services
(IGS) examined and reported upon the Euratom Safeguards Office’s objectives and
the extent to which these are fulfilled, its working methods, its structure and
organisation, its use of resources, its management and its relation with headquarters
in Brussels. The report, dated 15 May 2000, listed thirteen recommendations that
were gradually implemented during the year 2001.
The first three recommendations concern the missions of the Euratom Safeguards
Office and the way in which they were implemented. The IGS suggested that a High
Level Expert Group address these issues (see point 3.2 below).
The other recommendations concern mainly issues related to the organisation and
internal management of the ESO. All of them are in the process of being
implemented or are awaiting additional orientations to be provided in the final report
of the High Level Expert Group.
3.2. High Level Expert Group
The first recommendation of the IGS proposed the creation of a High Level Expert
Group (HLEG) to “undertake a review of Euratom Safeguards goals and objectives
with the view of making appropriate recommendations…”
Such HLEG was established by the Commission in June 2001. The mandate assigned
to it encompassed the following themes:
(1) redefine the ESO’s mission and its operational objectives to reflect today’s
circumstances, while taking into account the Commission obligations under
Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty and other relevant international
agreements based on this Treaty;
(2) draw up a Mission Statement for ESO, and a procedure to update it
periodically;
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4(3) analyse ESO’s workings methods and inspection procedures, and identify
implementation assessment methods thereof and performance indicators;
(4) assess the cost-benefit ratio between the related resources and ESO’s
obligations/responsibilities; set up an order of priorities to improve overall
efficiency at a constant level of resources;
(5) propose more efficient and transparent reporting mechanisms between ESO,
the Directorate General TREN and the Commissioner in charge;
(6) propose improved communication mechanisms about ESO's activities with
other European institutions, with Member States and with the public;
(7) assess a better complementarity implementation between ESO and the IAEA
inspectors on the territory of the European Union;
(8) spell out the possible consequences of these proposals in terms of internal
organisation, human and financial resources, and status; distinguish the core
functions of the Commission from the tasks that can be delegated and
outsourced.
Three experts were appointed: a former Vice-President of the European Commission;
a past Deputy Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
(Head of Safeguards Department); a retired Vice-President of an Industrial Group
active in the areas of energy, nuclear and transport. The HLEG received secretarial
support from an official of DG TREN (Brussels) and technical support from a team
of officials of the Euratom Safeguards Office.
The HLEG has broadly considered in its work the activities of the Euratom
Safeguards Office over the last two decades. The Group has noted with satisfaction
the efforts already undertaken by the new management since 20002.
3.3. Preparation of a new Regulation
The Euratom Treaty (Art. 79) requires that a regulation defines the nature and the
extent of the requirements to be fulfilled by the nuclear operators.
The existing Regulation (Euratom) no. 3227/763, in force since 1976, defines the
obligations of the operators of nuclear installations towards the Commission as far as
declaration of the basic technical characteristics of the installations and reporting of
nuclear material accountancy is concerned.
During the 25 years the Regulation has been in force, a number of developments
have occurred, not only in the nuclear industry and in information technology, but
also in the legal framework under which safeguards are applied (i.e. The New
Partnership Approach agreed between the Commission and the IAEA in 1992 and
the Protocols Additional4 to the Safeguards Agreement between the Community, the
Member States and the IAEA).
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3 Commission Regulation (EURATOM) no. 3227/76 of 19 October 1976, OJ L 363, 31.12.1976, p. 1
4 OJ L 67/1 of 13.3.1999
5Therefore, the Euratom Safeguards Office took the initiative of working out a new
draft Regulation which would review existing obligations under Regulation 3227/76,
cover the new reporting requirements imposed by the Additional Protocols and allow
for modernised reporting systems in line with state of the art information technology.
During 2001, a dedicated task force within the ESO prepared a draft of the new
Regulation, which after the successful consultations with other Commission services,
was approved by the Commission on 22 March 20025.
4. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: EURATOM VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
4.1. Nuclear Material Accountancy
The European Union area contains the full range of nuclear fuel cycle activities,
although they are not evenly dispersed throughout the Member States. The nuclear
material inventories in the installations under safeguards are constantly growing. For
example, the plutonium stocks during the last decade increased from 203 tonnes in
1990 to about 548 tonnes at the end of 2001. It has special safeguards interest
because of the sensitive nature of this material. During the same period, the total of
all types of uranium inventories in the European Union increased from 200 400
tonnes to about 314 610 tonnes at the end of 2001.
The nuclear installation operators reported all nuclear material inventories and flows
to the Euratom Safeguards Office. These reports amount to about 1.5 million
accountancy lines per year, the large majority of which is already received by
electronic means. All these data are checked for internal and external consistency
(transit matching) and compliance with the provisions of the Co-operation
Agreements with third countries.
All clerical mistakes and inconsistencies revealed during 2001 could be corrected
after consultation with the operators involved.
Accountancy reports were also sent to the IAEA in fulfilment of the obligations,
undertaken by the European Union in the framework of its Safeguards Agreements
with the IAEA. During the period covered by this report, the quality and the
timeliness of the reports met with the satisfaction of the IAEA.
4.2. Inspection Efforts and results
In 2001 inspection activities conducted by the Euratom Safeguards Office amounted
to 7 661 man-days, showing a reduction of about 9% in comparison with the year
2000.
Such an evolution results from the combination of three factors:
– a slight reduction in the staff available for the conduct of inspections (- 1,5%);
– a temporary slow down of activities in important reprocessing installations;
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6– the progressive development and implementation of new and more rational
approaches, agreed case by case, allowing for substantive increases in global
efficiency of the inspections undertaken during the second half of the year.
An approximate distribution of the inspection efforts made, according to the major
types of installations, shows that about 50% of the effort was spent in the
reprocessing facilities (see 4.2.1 below) and associated stores, 25% in Enrichment
and Fabrication facilities (see 4.2.2 to 4.2.4) and another 25% in power reactors,
research reactors (see 4.2.5) and other nuclear facilities (see 4.2.6).
The main concerns and/or results achieved in the course of the inspection activities
for each type of installations under control are summarised hereafter.
4.2.1. Reprocessing facilities6
The nuclear fuel reprocessing installation at Sellafield (THORP) operated from
April 2001 to the end of the year. The verification activities gave satisfactory results.
The Verification of the Physical Inventory (PIV) 2001 was successful. However, a
problem emerged in the second half of the year, whereby the operator's input sample
results appear biased, due to a change in the method used for the analysis. The
impact was noticed by the inspectors and the operators' internal control system. The
issue is subject to investigations and is expected to be resolved before the Physical
Inventory Verification in April 2002.
The results of the inspection activities in all areas of the Magnox reprocessing
facilities were satisfactory. The implementation of the tightened safety and security
measures and working rules on the Sellafield site tended to complicate the
organisation and smooth running of the routine verification activities in the Magnox
installations. The so-called "Written Scheme of Work for Euratom and IAEA
Inspectors", issued by BNFL in the UK to strengthen the safety procedures resulted
in significant additional administrative burden for the inspectors.
Beyond the routine inspections, the focus of ESO activities in Sellafield in 2001 was
on granting the approval by the Commission for the chemical processing of
irradiated materials in THORP (according to art. 78 Euratom, second paragraph)
and the preparation of a series of outstanding legal documents (Particular Safeguards
Provisions, PSP’s). The under art. 78 approval was finally granted by the
Commission on November 27; the PSP for Thorp came into force by the
Commission Decision of 11/07/2001. Further PSP’s entering into force in 2001 were
those for the Site Rail Sidings - Magnox Fuel, the Fuel Handling Plant – Decanners,
the Euratom On-Site Laboratory Sellafield and the THORP receipt and storage
ponds.
At the two reprocessing plants at La Hague (France), routine verifications made on
all Plutonium input and output flows allowed the confirmation of COGEMA
declarations. Like in the previous year, it was still not possible to draw conclusions
within the timeliness foreseen because of delays in declarations of some analysis
results used for accountancy balance by the operator. From October 2001, a new link
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7for transfers of Uranyl nitrate between the two reprocessing plants was made
operational and the transfers were verified. Due to the reduction in human resources,
Uranium outputs are no longer routinely checked.
The verification of the basic technical characteristics (BTC) of the new plutonium
conditioning line was successfully performed in co-operation with the operator
COGEMA.
Annual inventory verifications of the two processes and of the two plutonium
storages at La Hague have been conclusive.
The decommissioning plan for the Dounreay (UK) reprocessing facility includes
inter alia the removal of nuclear material from a number of areas on the site.
Accordingly, safeguards activities during the 2nd half of the year were dominated by
the sealing of SNR7 (MOX) fuel elements for shipment, an activity which was
undertaken successfully. In addition, there were two physical inventory verification
(PIV) inspections at Dounreay during the year. These activities, as well as routine
verifications were conclusive. The quality of safeguards at Dounreay greatly
improved in 2001 since site management implemented improvements as requested
by the Euratom Safeguards Office.
4.2.2. Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX)8
At the end of the year 2001 the British Authorities gave their consent for the
operation of the Sellafield MOX fabrication Plant (SMP). The facility is expected
to introduce Plutonium in the process by March 2002. The verification of the Basic
Technical Characteristics has been completed. The commissioning of Euratom
equipment for collection and treatment of data is prepared to start routine operations.
Data transmission tests (state of health information) to Luxembourg started in April
2001. The Uranium PIV did not give rise to comments.
An incident of erroneous declarations of a shipment of a small quantity of Natural
Uranium to another British installation was investigated by BNFL and measures to
avoid recurrence were taken. PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions) for this
installation were drafted and are being reviewed.
The Sellafield MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) status changed from
Manufacturing Facility to Support Facility. The inspection activities did not give rise
to major problems.
Inspections were carried out successfully together with the IAEA under the New
Partnership Approach (NPA) arrangements at the MOX fabrication plant in Dessel,
Belgium. Some equipment failures occurred during the early part of the year which
led to re-verification of material.
Increased inspection effort was dedicated to the MOX fabrication plant of Cogema
Cadarache following the new inspection approach followed since 2000. This meant
a high frequency inspection regime and the installation of new NDA (non-destructive
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8assay) equipment. In the year 2001 Euratom inspection objectives were fully
satisfied.
The safeguards operations at MELOX in Marcoule, France continued at the usual
good level. The undue delays in presenting items sampled for non-destructive assay
during interim verifications were addressed by ESO and the operator is taking
measures to avoid recurrence. The annual Physical Inventory Verification of the
plant was conducted by ESO inspectors in July, with satisfactory results.
At the Siemens MOX Fabrication Plant and BfS Hanau (Germany) the
decommissioning activities continued throughout 2001 and for the first time included
the Plutonium bulk handling part of the installation. Despite the fact that there is no
longer any production, this site still has a large safeguarded direct use material
inventory. Verifications were conclusive.
4.2.3. Enrichment Facilities9
The Eurodif gas-diffusion enrichment plant in Pierrelatte was subject to high
frequency (weekly) inspection throughout 2001, including one Physical Inventory
Verification. During these inspections all of the Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
output from the plant was verified. However, neither the input of natural uranium nor
the tails were verified systematically due to limitations in resources. There was no
evidence found that the civil material in the facility was anything other than properly
accounted for. However, constraints placed by France on the inspectors due to the
"particular status"10 of the facility and the large stocks of nuclear material present
mean that the level of the achieved safeguards assurance is somewhat limited.
All three URENCO centrifuge enrichment plants in the Union (Almelo-NL, Gronau-
DE and Capenhurst-UK) are safeguarded together with the IAEA, the one in the UK
having been voluntarily offered for safeguards by the UK authorities. The safeguards
approach includes verification of all feed material before it is connected to the
process and all product or tails material before it is shipped from the facility.
Verifications done in addition to accountancy checks, include weighing, Non
Destructive Assay, Destructive Assay and containment & surveillance measures. On
that basis, the operator declarations of nuclear material flow and inventory were
deemed acceptable.
For reasons of commercial sensitivity as well as proliferation risk, access to
centrifuge cascade areas is highly restricted. Therefore, in the course of 2001, a new
generic safeguards approach incorporating an appropriate mix of different measures
has been formulated and presented to the plant operators of all centrifuge enrichment
plants. The innovation mainly concerns the consolidation of existing and recently
developed techniques (such as HPTA11) applied for the direct confirmation of
absence of high enriched uranium production in plant areas with restricted access.
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11 High Performance Trace Analysis
94.2.4. LEU and HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion Facilities12
Routine inspections and Inventory Verifications at the Fuel Fabrication Plants at
Juzbado (ENUSA, Spain) and Västerås (Westinghouse Atom AB, Sweden) were
performed with satisfactory results. In October 2001, Westinghouse Atom reported
an erroneous shipment of an "empty" container to Ranstad Mineral (Sweden) which
contained Nuclear Material. The matter was evaluated, and recommendations to
avoid recurrence were made by ESO to the operator. The PSP for Westinghouse
Atom came into force in 2001.
At the FBFC LEU fabrication plant in Belgium, three new reference rods were
brought into use following a rigorous procedure of procurement, analyses, and
continuity of knowledge. These will be used to confirm safeguards verification
measurements on production rods at monthly inspections. New methods and
equipment for waste and scrap material measurements were initiated and partially
tested during the PIV. The results of the PIV were satisfactory.
At COGEMA Pierrelatte (France), inspections were carried out as necessary in
accordance with the operational plan in order to verify the transfers of civil material
to and from a (non safeguarded) process, imports, exports, and some receipts and
shipments. One annual inventory was carried out. There was no evidence that the
civil material in the facility was anything other than properly accounted for. The
large stocks of material at the facility mean that the achieved level of safeguards
assurance is somewhat limited.
At COMHURHEX Pierrelatte and Malvesi (France), annual inventories were
performed. There was no evidence that the civil material in the facilities was
anything other than properly accounted for.
At the LEU fabrication plant of FBFC in Romans-sur-Isère (France), the annual
Physical Inventory of the plant was verified by ESO inspectors in August. Although
there was no evidence of diversion, several shortcomings were detected and had to
be corrected by the operator.
The annual Physical Inventory Verification at CERCA, HEU Fabrication plant in
Romans (France) is still unsatisfactory, as the operator could not provide a computer-
readable list of inventory items. Recently however the operator made an offer for
developing a software that will allow him to extract the relevant data on a computer-
readable device. Active neutron counting was performed on four finished fuel
assemblies fabricated by CERCA for the Research Reactor in Garching, Germany.
The measured items remain under Euratom seals.
At BNFL Springfields (UK), because of the size and diversity of the plant, the
continuous nature and high frequency of imports and exports, a weekly inspection
regime is maintained. Inspection effort is gradually shifting toward heavy
concentration on the new oxide fuel complex and related facilities. There is a policy
in place of verifying all receipts and shipments subject to advance notifications, as
well as sealing of all exports from the EU. The inspections have brought to light an
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erroneously reported transfer of material from Sellafield, systematic weight
differences among some imported drums, and a large shortfall in the enriched-
uranium category in the mixed installations of Springfields at the PIV. Requirements
to the operator regarding measurement uncertainties to allow for better evaluation of
the material balances have been defined.
At the LEU fuel fabrication plant at Lingen (Germany) the inspectors have
undertaken actions in order to further improve the quality of the nuclear material
balance. This included revised procedures for reporting shipper-receiver differences
on receipt of UF6 material. Furthermore, in line with a request from inspectors, the
operator reduced the relatively high amount of non-homogeneous scrap material
present at the plant to improve the quality of the PIV assessment.
4.2.5. Nuclear Power and Research Reactors13
The planned routine and PIV inspections at power reactors in Belgium and
Germany were performed as planned and gave satisfactory results, including
however in several cases follow-up and additional inspection effort.
In terms of inspection resources required by activities in connection with the loading
and sealing of CASTOR flasks in Belgium and Germany, Greifswald (Germany)
was the most important site, and this despite several licensing problems that resulted
in a lower than anticipated loading programme by the operator. During 2001 almost
one thousand assemblies were verified and placed under containment and
surveillance.
High priority continues to be given to reactors using MOX fuel in NNWS (see
footnote 16). Despite several serious safeguards problems due to equipment failure
or operator error, quick reaction meant that potential safeguards anomalies could be
obviated (on two occasions by re-measuring the fresh MOX assemblies).
A further problem was the verification of fresh MOX fuel that was not loaded to the
core during the annual refuelling. In certain cases it was difficult to convince
operators to accept this additional burden.
In the UK, draft PSP proposals for AGRs were handed over to the operators for
comments. A meeting between Euratom, British Energy and DTI (Department of
Trade and Industry) on these proposals is planned for early 2002.
Spanish reactors surveillance encountered some problems during 2001. ESO
currently intends to install completely new systems in five such reactors in order to
apply full NPA. Following a safeguards problem in 2000 as a result of operator error
in one Spanish LWR, the core fuel was successfully re-established in 2001 by a
highly intrusive NDA method.
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Controls at the High Flux Reactor site at Petten (NL) had to be accentuated in 2001
because of the increase in the stocks in the storage pools following the lack of
transport possibilities for spent fuel. The possibilities for recycling of the uranium
into the production of fresh targets, thereby alleviating the problem, are being
studied. In this respect it has to be noted that starting even a small reprocessing plant
will require Commission approval. In the meantime the reactor was stopped on a
temporary basis at the request of the Dutch Government due to concerns associated
with the ageing of the pressure reactor vessel.
4.2.6. Other installations or facilities
At Sellafield (UK), the inspection activities in the input stores (irradiated fuel) and
the output store (Plutonium Oxide) gave satisfactory results. However, persistent
technical problems with the operators equipment caused long delays in the
performance of the planned inspection activities in some of the spent fuel ponds.
The PSP for Ranstad Mineral (waste treatment facility in Sweden) came into force
in 2001.
At Berkeley Technology Centre (UK), the problems mentioned in the last ESO
report relating to the physical follow up of nuclear material have now been
overcome.
A revised draft version of the Facility Attachment for COGEMA La Hague
concerning the area for receipt and reconditioning of unirradiated MOX fuel for
Japan, inspected jointly with the IAEA, has been sent to France.
Continuity of knowledge has been lost three times during 2001 for the LWR
irradiated fuel storage ponds at La Hague, inspected jointly with the IAEA. All
three anomalies were triggered by the operator following lighting problems. These
losses that rendered necessary the re-establishment of the inventory knowledge
constituted a heavy load for inspections.
At the CLAB14 storage ponds in Sweden, a transport container was not available for
verification in April 2001. The verification of the fuel assemblies, though postponed,
was successful. A first draft of the Particular Safeguards Provisions for this
installation has been sent to Sweden.
4.3. Global evaluation of the safeguards activities
During the reporting period of 2001, in-field statistical evaluation of the difference
between physical inventory and book inventory was carried out at the moment of
Physical Inventory Verifications in fuel fabrication plants to support timely decisions
about the material balance for that specific period.
For MOX fuel fabrication plants, part of the evaluation activities focussed on similar
recent historical differences with a view to assess whether or not long-term
systematic measurement errors exist in the measurement system on which the
accounting records are based.
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For large-scale plutonium production plants the evaluation activities consisted, inter
alia, in drawing-up procedures to evaluate declarations of nuclear transformations15
and in re-verifying scale calibration parameters.
In enrichment plants, historical Operator-Inspector differences based on Destructive
Analysis16 were analysed in order to determine and assess the inspector’s and
operator’s measurement uncertainties. The results of these activities did not give rise
to any concerns and lead to the routine follow-up of such activities.
5. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES UNDER THE NPA17
5.1. The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report
The Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) of the IAEA covering the joint
activities on the territory of the EU in 2000 was made available to ESO in early June
2001. A meeting at the IAEA headquarters took place in the second half of June to
review the findings and discuss details relating to nuclear installations in the EU. At
the same time a critical analysis of the content of the SIR was prepared as a working
paper from the Commissions services and sent to the Council for examination by the
experts of the Atomic Questions Group. The mechanistic findings reported in the SIR
were the subject of extensive review and evaluation within ESO. A joint ESO/IAEA
review meeting was held in November 2001 to identify facts worth noting and agree
on recommendations for improvements when appropriate.
All in all, the SIR 2000 concluded that there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear
material or misuse of equipment or facilities placed under safeguards in the European
Union.
Nevertheless, the SIR complained about slow progress in the conclusion, approval
and entry into force of the IAEA Additional Protocols in the EU, despite their main
aim were to facilitate the detection of illicit nuclear activities in less reliable areas in
the world.
It should, however, be mentioned that the SIR 2000 recognised the efforts made by
ESO to prepare for the implementation of the Additional Protocols when they will
enter into force in the European Union.
For the first time, the SIR mentioned that increased co-operation with regional
systems of nuclear materials accounting, such as the one established by the Euratom
Treaty, could enhance the effectiveness of verification by the IAEA and its cost
efficiency and welcomed further improvements along these lines.
Better use should be made by the IAEA of the safeguards results of regional systems.
This would allow the Vienna Agency to concentrate its limited means where
increased controls are needed and justified.
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As a conclusion, the SIR noted a downward trend regarding illicit trafficking in
nuclear materials. No serious case had been reported in the last two years in the EU.
In addition to its global conclusions, the SIR 2000 made recommendations for
improvement in specific areas. These recommendations may be summarised as
follows:
– shipment of Partially Filled or Empty Transport Containers should take place
Prior to Core Opening at LWRs;
– advanced notification for movement of empty or partially filled containers
should be requested by ESO and information transmitted to the IAEA in good
time to facilitate inspection activities;
– a number of solutions have been identified to the generic problems associated
with Plutonium Production in Large Research Reactors. The risks in these
types of facilities will be eliminated after the installation of the most suitable
Power Monitors at the facilities concerned;
– all LWR MOX facilities were successfully verified and passed safeguards
criteria, showing improvement through enhanced co-operation with ESO,
prompt follow-up actions, smooth (but cost-ineffective) execution of short
notice inspections and use of underwater cameras;
– corrective actions need to be taken during or soon after a Containment and
Surveillance failure is detected. The IAEA considers important to further
install protective covers on seals and back-up open core surveillance systems.
The IAEA should fully bear the cost of this redundant equipment not needed
by ESO;
– problems occur according to the IAEA mechanistic system when nuclear
material remains in closed shipping containers, over long periods or when
nuclear materials at reactors are present in the form of rods in closed
containers, rendering it not easily accessible.
Improvements in the way in which the NPA will be implemented in the future shall
contribute further to a more even cost sharing between the two inspectorates and
better consistency between conclusions drawn in the SIR and those resulting from
full safeguards activities conducted by the ESO.
5.2. Preparation for the entry into force of the IAEA Additional Protocols
The main aim of the Additional Protocols is to increase the IAEA’s capabilities to
detect undeclared nuclear material and activities that are in violation of the NPT
(Non Proliferation Treaty) provisions.
This expanded legal authority of the IAEA contained in the Additional Protocol
encompasses three main categories of new measures: (a) information on nuclear
activities and on nuclear related research to be provided to the IAEA in a
comprehensive way; (b) complementary physical access to locations beyond purely
nuclear installations to be granted to the IAEA for the purpose of verifying this
information, (c) new technologies to be used by the IAEA to apply safeguards in a
more effective and cost efficient manner.
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These new measures may also affect the activities and responsibilities of the Euratom
Safeguards Office on the territory of the European Community. The Commission
might therefore be committed to carry out new tasks after the entry into force of the
Additional Protocols, namely:
(1) to provide the IAEA with the information required as far as it concerns
nuclear material and related sites for all Member States of the European
Union;
(2) to implement all measures related to the Community’s Joint Research Centre
(JRC), including those which the Protocol sets out for States, in close
collaboration with the State on whose territory an establishment of the JRC is
located.
With a view to ensure a smooth implementation of the Additional Protocol in the EU
after its entry into force, two field trials (JRC at Petten and VTT in Helsinki) are
currently being carried out to test the modalities for the information flow required by
the IAEA, for the delimitation of nuclear sites and the arrangements for
complementary access.
In other areas subject to the rules of the Additional Protocol considered unanimously
by the EU Council as of sole Member States responsibilities, Annex III of the
Protocol foresees, nevertheless, a possibility to transfer the implementation of these
measures to the Commission if the responsible Member State so wishes. This transfer
would require a formal decision by the Commission accepting to carry out the
task(s).
So far, seven to eight Member States18 (out of the 13 NNWS)19 have expressed their
intention to request the Commission to implement these measures on their behalf20,
but the detailed modalities for such a transfer would not be identical.
On several occasions the Commission made clear that it was not prepared to accept
new activities – especially outside its formal responsibilities – without receiving at
the same time, from the budget authority, the resources needed in order to implement
them properly.
Therefore, up to now the Commission has clearly indicated that it was not prepared
to accept the transfer of responsibilities pertaining solely to the Member States.
Nevertheless, preparatory work has already been carried out on a limited scale with
the objective to assess the implications for the Euratom Safeguards Office of the
additional tasks under consideration.
                                                
18 Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and still awaiting formal
confirmation Italy
19 Non Nuclear Weapon States
20 A legally binding commitment by a Member State to transfer the implementation of measures to the
Commission can only occur after entry into force of the Additional Protocol in form of a so-called side-
letter that will have to be sent to the IAEA
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6. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: PROGRESS IN SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY AND
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
During the year 2001 priority has been given to the introduction of new technology
into the field to replace obsolete instrumentation. In connection with this activity
appropriate computer hardware and software for nuclear data acquisition and data
interpretation have also been implemented.
The most important areas of progress during the year were:
– Installation and routine application of a new digital video surveillance system
in plutonium bulk handling plants. The new digital surveillance systems afford
possibilities to enhance data treatment and to facilitate review optimising
available human resources. They also open the possibility for data transmission
of recorded images to headquarters with a view to reducing manpower
requirements in the field.
– The design and configuration of a new transponder seal provides the
opportunity for on site verification, which will not only improve the inspection
efficiency but also reduce the overall annual usage and enhance the handling
logistics back at headquarters. The IAEA have been closely involved during
the different phases of the testing and implementation of this new safeguards
product.
– Important progress was made on the implementation of evaluation tools
developed to facilitate the interpretation of measurement data. In addition tests
on the feasibility of data transfer to and from ESO headquarters by satellite
have been carried out using the ASTRA facility located in Luxembourg.
7. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
7.1. European Parliament (EP)
The 1999-2000 ESO activities report is the subject of an EP initiative report. For
2001 activity was dominated by M.E.P.’s questions related to nuclear safety and
security. The interest focused on the possible consequences of terrorist attacks
against nuclear installations, the leak of radioactive effluents into the environment
and the licensing of the Sellafield MOX facility by UK government authorities.
7.2. Enlargement
The project set up to ease the implementation of the Euratom Nuclear Material
Accountancy System by countries candidate to EU accession, via software tools and
the required hardware progressed well. Representatives of the applicant countries
actively contributed to the project through their participation in a steering committee,
which also ensures that the tool is tailor-made to their needs.
7.3. Member States
While the Euratom Treaty stipulates that the Commission deals directly with nuclear
material operators, ESO considers regular contacts with Member States authorities as
essential for the smooth implementation of safeguards in the respective States. In
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addition, discussions took place with a number of Member States to prepare for the
implementation of the measures of the Additional Protocol.
The Atomic Questions Group of the Council was briefed on the progress made in the
preparation of the implementation of the Additional Protocol, the revision of the
Euratom Regulation no. 3227/76 (see footnote 2) and the IAEA Safeguards
Implementation Reports for the Member States of the European Union.
7.4. Euratom agreements
For the period covered by this report, the three Community nuclear co-operation
agreements into force, respectively with the United States of America, Canada and
Australia, were implemented to the satisfaction of all Parties involved. This was in
particular confirmed during the bilateral technical Working Group and Consultation
between Euratom and Australia that took place in Canberra in June 2001.
The Euratom Safeguards Office actively participated in the on–going negotiation of a
nuclear co-operation agreement between Euratom and Japan. The progress achieved
during the negotiation rounds that took place in 2001, gives hope for a successful
conclusion of the agreement in the near future.
Concerning a future nuclear co-operation agreement with China, and following the
interest expressed by parties involved, a draft negotiation mandate was submitted by
the Commission to the Council. It is expected that the mandate will be approved
during the first half of 2002, so that the negotiations could start soon after.
8. EURATOM SAFEGUARDS RESOURCES
8.1. Budget appropriations
Article 174 of the Euratom Treaty specifically mentions the necessity to include
appropriations in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure related to the
activity of nuclear safeguards.
Founded on this legal basis the safeguards activities are financed by two types of
budget appropriations:
(1) a general “functioning” appropriation involving the costs of ESO’s overheads
such as officers’ salaries, rental of headquarters’ offices, general IT
equipment, telecommunications, etc. (Part A of the Budget, lines A0-5010,
A0-7002, A0-7010, A0-7030), as well as a specific appropriation for the
medical survey and the radiation protection of the inspectors (Part A of the
Budget, line A0-1420);
(2) specific “operational” appropriations foreseen for the expenditure of ESO,
directly related to nuclear safeguards such as mission costs, rental of offices
on site (including on site laboratories), purchase of technical equipment and
samples taking and analysis, contracts for services (i.e. maintenance and
repairs), transportation of equipment and samples, training, etc.., necessary
for Euratom safeguards activities (Part B of the Budget, sub-chapter B4-2).
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For 2001, the specific operational appropriations in the EU Budget for the Euratom
Safeguards Office represented € 17.7 Mio. From that amount € 17.562 Mio (99.2%)
were actually committed. The sharing of the expenditures were as follows:
 Inspection mission costs (travel means,
daily allowances): € 4.5 Mio (26%)
 Rental of offices for the inspectors on inspected
sites (and related equipment costs): € 0.75 Mio (4.3%)
 Purchase, installation, maintenance and repairs of
equipment on sites, including informatic means,
analysis of samples, related costs such as transport,
consumables, spare parts, etc.: € 4.45 Mio (25%)
 Investments made in large scale plutonium bulk
handling plants and related maintenance, operation
and logistics: € 7.4 Mio (42%)
 Administrative and technical assistance, training
for inspectors, and other expenses (including
special insurance coverage: € 0.5 Mio (3%)
The number of inspections on site, after a stabilization in the last 3 to 4 years, have
been reduced in 2001, in parallel to an increase of stand by equipment and remote
controlled systems in the installations.
Major investments related to large Plutonium bulk handling installations have
already been completed. The costs of those plants still represent an important part of
the expenditures. Out of the € 7.400 Mio annual costs, more than 50% currently
represent maintenance and technical support on the existing equipment.
8.2. Human and other Resources
8.2.1. Staff Resources and Utilisation
The Euratom Safeguards Office employs a team of officials, including inspectors,
plus appropriate administrative and logistical support in its headquarters in
Luxembourg, which accounted for 269 permanent posts, at the end of 2001.
Of these posts, 208 were allocated to staff having the status of nuclear inspector
according to art. 81 of the Euratom Treaty.
8.2.2. Safeguards Equipment
The Safeguards equipment used by the inspectors fall into two main categories. The
first corresponds to Non Destructive Assay (NDA) measurements that are used by
inspectors to assure themselves that the physical quantities of nuclear material in the
facilities correspond to the notified accountancy values. The methods used are based
upon neutron and gamma measurement techniques.
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The second category corresponds to Containment and Surveillance (C&S) measures.
These are in the form of video camera surveillance and seals and prevent the loss of
knowledge on verified material.
Further efforts have been made in 2001 to rationalise and standardise the range of
hardware and software equipment used. The hardware of both NDA and C & S is
based upon commercially available products. The software used for the data analysis
of both neutron and gamma measurements in attended mode applications were
developed specifically for safeguards applications.
8.2.3 Support by the Commission Joint Research Centre
The Commission Joint Research Centre provides scientific and technical support to
the Euratom Safeguards Office inspectorate for both routine activities in the
laboratories and related development work for future improvements to safeguards
activities through the Commission Research and Development programme. In the
Fifth Framework Programme for the year 2001, the support included provision for 58
man/year and a specific credit of € 1.72 Mio distributed principally between ITU
(Karlsruhe)21 and IPSC (Ispra)22.
The co-operation between ESO and the JRC was mainly focussed on the following
areas:
– concerning the Transuranium Institute in Karlsruhe:operation of the On-Site
Laboratories, Sample Analysis at ITU and in-field, High Performance Trace
Analysis, and Nuclear Forensic Analysis, improvement of analytical methods;
– for the IPSC Ispra Institute: General Scientific and Technical Support in the
areas of Health Physics,testing of Equipment and instruments; technical
training and calibration; measurement and counting support, development of
sealing and surveillance techniques;
– from the IRMM23 Geel: Analytical Activities in the domain ofanalytical quality
control and provision of high quality nuclear reference materials.
For the operation of the On Site Laboratories at La Hague and Sellafield, an
administrative arrangement entered into force between the ESO and ITU (Karlsruhe),
to provide the necessary appropriately trained staff (20 persons) for the running of
the laboratories throughout the year. The cost of this arrangement € 1.7 Mio
corresponds to a total of 340 missions per annum.
                                                
21 Transuranium Institute (JRC)
22 Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen
23 Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements
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9. OTHER ACTIVITIES WITH ESO INVOLVEMENT
9.1. Nuclear Safety, physical protection and illicit trafficking
In the enlargement context, ESO provided technical expertise required in the
evaluation of the nuclear safety standard in Eastern European nuclear installations,
and, contributed to the overall co-ordination effort in the nuclear safety evaluation.
After the tragic terrorist attacks on 11 September, and like almost all other nuclear
operators and holders of nuclear material, ESO examined the adequacy of existing
physical protection measures and made an effort to further strengthen activities in
that field through acquisition of relevant expertise and training.
The Euratom Safeguards Office continued to play an active role in experts groups
where prevention and detection mechanisms and communication and intervention
procedures are discussed. ESO also worked in close co-operation with the IAEA and
maintained informal contacts with national authorities, Europol and other dedicated
agencies.
9.2. Support to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
ESO continued to provide support to the IAEA and the international safeguards
community for the development of the Strengthened and Integrated Safeguards
System. It assisted the IAEA in the development of new safeguards approaches to be
implemented in States where the IAEA will be able to conclude that no State
clandestine nuclear material or activities exist. ESO also assisted the IAEA in the
development of new concepts for the use of State and Regional Systems of
Accountancy and Control, the use of inspections announced at short notice and the
resolution of anomalies.
Within the existing framework of the New Partnership Approach, which is an
integral part of the safeguards co-operation between ESO and the IAEA in the
European Union, information is regularly exchanged concerning new safeguards
equipment and instrumentation. Both organisations work closely together in the field
to optimise the financial and human resources in the establishment of an effective
safeguards infrastructure within the European Union. The synergy through this co-
operation greatly benefits the IAEA in the effectiveness and efficiency of the
discharge of their obligations in the EU. It is now time for the ESO also to draw
some benefit from the implementation of the NPA signed in 1992.
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10. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
For the activities carried out by the ESO during the period of 2001 the following
conclusions can be drawn:
(1) As suggested by the report of the IGS in 2000, the mission of the ESO and its
existing safeguards approaches were reviewed by a HLEG established by a
Commission decision in June 2001. The implementation of the
recommendations made will be carried out during the period 2002-2003.
(2) Concerning the results of the verification activities:
(a) Matching problems between measurements and corresponding
notifications made by operators on the one side, and inspection results
on the other side persisted in some plants; explanations were found or
investigations are still going on;
(b) however, based on the analysis of the overall results no significant
indication for the diversion of nuclear material from its declared use
was found.
(3) Concerning activities at specific installations:
(a) The Commission’s approval required under Article 78, § 2, of the
Euratom treaty for the operation of the THORP reprocessing plant in
the nuclear complex at Sellafield was granted in November 2001. The
negotiations of several PSP’s for other sites were also successfully
concluded over the year;
(b) a new safeguards approach for the URENCO enrichment facilities was
developed and discussed with the operator concerned and the IAEA.
This new approach which draws heavily from HPTA techniques is
better suited to protect commercially sensitive technology and
information while providing the assurances required;
(c) the safeguarding activities carried out in France in mixed installation,
or installations of “particular status”, encountered still a number of
difficulties even if serious progress has been registered relating to
safeguards assurances;
(d) the Destructive Assay (DA) analysis of Plutonium and other samples
collected in reprocessing plants was possible because of the existence
of the onsite laboratories, avoiding the administrative and practical
obstacles caused by the transport authorisations needed for a transfer
of samples from other bulk installations to the ITU (Karlsruhe);
(e) in reactors, a substantial increase in the loading of transport containers
with spent fuel elements for interim storage was experienced with the
associated pressure on resources for the ESO.
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(4) A further improvement in the co-operation with the IAEA was achieved,
reflected in the SIR which confirms the conclusions drawn by ESO on the
non-diversion of nuclear material from its declared use.
(5) First experience has shown that the increased reliance on unattended
surveillance/containment and remote monitoring systems can lead to
efficiency gains in the use of resources, even if manpower needs were not
reduced substantially.
(6) The co-operation with the JRC was carried out in a smooth and very effective
way, and, thereby contributed substantially to the effectiveness of ESO and to
the JRC’s increase in overall scientific expertise recognition and
competitiveness in the international arena.
(7) All in all, the objectives defined for ESO’s activities as set out in Chapter VII
of the Euratom treaty were attained in the year 2001.
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Annexes
Table no. 1 – Quantities of nuclear material under Euratom safeguards
End 1990 End 1995 End 20001) End 20011)
Plutonium 203 406  525  548
Uranium
Total 200 400 269 100 310 400 314 610
HEU2) 13 11  10  10
LEU3) 32 000 46 700 55 500 57 000
NU4) 44 000 51 400 53 700 52 700
DU5) 124 400 171 000 201 200 204 900
Thorium 2 600 4 600 4 500 4 500
1) Quantities based on final reported data
2) High Enriched Uranium
3) Low Enriched Uranium
4) Natural Uranium
5) Depleted Uranium
Table no. 2 - Inspection activities of Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO)
Person days of
inspection in: 1999 2000 2001
Non Nuclear
Weapon States 2412 2113 2328
France 3492 3426 2934
UK 2871 2895 2399
Total 8775 8434 7661
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Table no. 3 – ESO’s Staff Situation End 2001




















4) Inspections on site 42 97 139












TOTAL 73 196 269
*) Activity Based Budgeting
Table no. 4 – ESO’s Budget 2001
Expenditures committed for the specific appropriations
Table no. 4 A
Line B4-2000 : Safeguard inspections, training and retraining of inspectors
Topics Expenditures (Thousand €)
a) Studies, convocation of experts, publications 11
b) Mission Costs 3,800
c) Transportation
for staff and equipment
700
d) Rental of offices and special services on sites 750
e) Internships and Training 200
f) Special insurance 40
TOTAL 5,501 (out of 5,600)
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Table no. 4 B
Line B4-2020 : Sampling and analyses, equipment, specific work, provision of
services and transport
Topics Expenditures (Thousand €)
a) Administrative and technical assistance 214
b) Purchase of surveillance equipment 429
c) Purchase of measurement equipment 1,132
d) Purchase of equipment for seals 378
e) Purchase and maintenance of computing
equipment directly linked to inspections
424
f) Costs for destructive analysis 65
g) Equipment spares, repairs, accessories
and maintenance
378
h) Consumable items, purchase of sources,
transport of radioactive materials
265
i) Monitoring (warning system based in
Luxembourg)
239
j) Software (Accountancy program,
Management and IT Firewall)
1,137
TOTAL 4,661 (out of 4,700)
Table no. 4 C
Line B4-2021 : Specific safeguards for large-scale plutonium processing plants
Topics Expenditures (Thousand €)
a) Sellafield – BNFL (THORP, MOX) 642
b) La Hague – COGEMA (UP3, UP2) 857
c) Cadarache – COGEMA 46
d) Marcoule – MELOX 70
e) Dessel – BELGONUCLEAIRE 43
f) On site laboratories (initial investments
and operations)
3,355
g) Software (on sites) 401
h) Maintenance & repairs (Equipment,
hardware and software support)
1,153
i) Software development (new applications,
new equipment )
833
TOTAL 7,400 (out of 7,400)
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Table no. 4 D
Line A0-1420 : Health checks for staff exposed to radiation
Topics Expenditures (Thousand €)
a) Gamma spectrometry and Toxicological
analysis (non standard)
45
b) Measurement equipment (dosimeters) 53
c) Maintenance and calibration 5
d) Material, services and other
contamination controls
44
e) Mission costs (for body-counter) 56
f) Other running expenses 18
TOTAL 221 (out of 224)
Table no. 5 – ESO’s Budget 1991-2001 (Mio €)
Evolution of expenditure for the specific budget appropriations
Budget Line 1991 1995 2001
Safeguard inspections, training


















TOTAL 7.5 19.5 17.8
